shows the economic and financial situation in France, Britain, and the United States at about the time of the French Revolution. Debt service consumed about 60 percent of tax revenues in all three countries.'? But the debt-to-GNP ratio was approaching two in Britain and was closer to one-half in France and the United States. Obviously, the countries differed widely in the burden of taxation as a fraction of GNP and in the ratio of debt service to debt capital. 
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Weir A tax rate of over 12 percent of GNP for Britain versus nearly 7 percent for France results in a ratio of debt service to GNP similarly higher in Britain (7 percent versus 4 percent). Equally important in explaining the vastly higher British debt-to-GNP ratio is the ratio of annual charges for debt service to the debt capital. The outlier here is France, with annual charges equal to 7.5 percent of the debt in contrast with Britain and the United States at under 4 percent. The two main reasons are that at least 30 percent of French debt service was for amortization, whereas Britain was not redeeming any of its debt, and the rate of interest was higher on French borrowing. 15 There were differences in definition and accounting for debt, but they should not be of great importance to the comparison. In Britain, lenders to the government were credited with a stock of capital corresponding to their annual interest payments at the official interest rate. The government kept records of these sums. Most bonds were sold at a discount, however, so the official nominal debt exceeds the sums raised by the government. In 1786 it also exceeded the market valuation of the stock of debt.16 In France, the government did not keep equivalent records, so estimates of the debt are generally based on an evaluation of the debt charges.17
The evidence about debt burden has some bearing on issues outside the limits of this article. James Riley has suggested that French '" Of the 292.2 million livres in French debt service, 65.8 million were explicitly for debt redemption (remboursement), mostly for short-term loans contracted during the American War. See Braesch, Finances, vol. 2, pp. 192-203. That is about 36.5 percent of the non-life annuity portion of the debt service. In addition, the 102.3 million in annual payments on life annuities and tontines, mostly bought at 8 to 10 percent interest, contain a substantial fraction of amortization in addition to a high rate of interest. It is difficult to separate the two. If 20 percent is taken as a probable lower bound on the share of amortization, the life annuity interest rate is between 6 and 8 percent and amortization is not less than 30 percent of total debt service. 16 17 My estimates agree with Braesch, Finances, vol. 2, with regard to the floating and short-term debt plus the acquisitions and liquidations, that is, everything except perpetual rents, life annuities, and tontines. Annual interest charges were assessed by the government at 5 percent, so the corresponding capital is estimated here at 20 times the annual interest, or 1,420.66 million livres. Braesch inappropriately used the same multiplier for perpetuals and life annuity rents after taxes. For each life annuity loan (including tontines), I calculated the fraction of original rents extinguished as of 1789 from the summary table in Marion, Histoirefinanciere, applied that fraction to the original capital raised, and subtracted it from the original capital to get the surviving capital. Summed over all loans, that left 1,117.694 million livres in capital. An analogous procedure for the perpetual rents (some of which had been redeemed) suggests 2,042.054 million livres in capital by 1789, for a total debt of 4,580 million. Over half the perpetual debt (1,190.214 million) was attributable to two huge loans in 1720 associated with the liquidation of Law's system, at interest rates of 1 percent and 2.5 percent, for which much of the capital provided was depreciated paper. Reevaluating those two loans at 5 percent interest, the remaining perpetual capital would be 1,339.408 million and the total debt 3,877.8 million. Tables 1 and 2. government debt was bad for economic growth. 18 Williamson has made the same claim for England.'9 But the fact that the debt burden was heavier in Britain, where economic growth was faster, would seem to pose a problem. A simple answer is that the underlying forces making for growth in Britain were sufficiently stronger as to outweigh the ill effects of crowding-out. A more interesting answer would explore structural differences in the two economies for reasons why crowdingout might operate more strongly in France. And the fact that England generally won the wars financed by debt could also be significant. The debt burden in 1788 cannot explain why France had a revolution. The past history of the debt burden itself cannot either. survivor in the class. An additional 1,250 livres would be paid to one member of each class (or an adult substitute) to handle payments and verifications. There are three roles involved in a tontine contract, not counting the 104 Weir government. I will define "subscriber" to mean the person providing the initial capital, "shareholder" to be the person entitled to receive the annual income, and "nominee" to be the person on whose life the contract is contingent. These three roles can each be filled by a different person, though in practice two forms dominated. The most common was for one person to fill all three. The second was for one person (typically a parent) to act as subscriber and as shareholder during his own lifetime, with the shareholder rights passing to the nominee (typically a child) at the death of the subscriber. Besides the name and the general economic structure, two important administrative features of the original tontine appear in all the later French versions. The first is a distinct separation of its administration from the royal treasury and a guarantee that the payments would not be violated by even the most extreme royal necessities. This was clearly designed to appeal to a financially astute bourgeoisie that was distrustful of royal administration. The second is a complicated set of verification procedures for the age of the nominee on whose life the revenues were contingent and the dates of their subsequent deaths.24 Three mechanisms were used: an annual notarized stamp for which proof of survival was needed to obtain payments, penalties for fraudulent receipt of payments, and, as a small incentive for honesty, the right of heirs to collect payments for the year in which the nominee died, providing the death was reported in a timely fashion.
Tonti's projections were ambitious. Each class was scheduled to receive 101,250 livres in rents plus 1,250 in overhead. That would have required 67,500 subscriptions, and netted 20,253,000 livres in capital. When the plan was put to the Parlement of Paris for approval in 1653, it was turned down for two main reasons. They found it too difficult to calculate its actual cost to the state, and they found its initial interest rates (5 percent at all ages) too low in comparison with rates on life annuities. These issues of pricing and cost also reappear in future plans. Table 3 compares the subsequent history of tontines in France and England.25 French tontines were more successful in several respects. Most of them succeeded in raising at least the sum of revenues sought by the government, whereas the English never did. France raised more money overall-on the order of nine times as much.26 French tontines 24 Placing administration in the hands of the subscribers is not unrelated to the verification issue. Subscribers had a strong interest in preventing fraudulent receipts because they would reduce the payments to true survivors. The government's payout did not depend on number of survivors, so it had no incentive for verification until the very end when costs were low. 25 also attracted a far greater number of participants, although the actual number has been overstated by other authors. The figures in Table 3 for number of individuals purchasing shares are new estimates for the fourth through tenth French tontines. Earlier estimates overlooked important changes in tontine rules. Subscribers could always buy multiple shares in their age group class. The tontines after 1730 introduced a new twist. Age classes were subdivided into many divisions. The tontine principle applied within each division, that is, the government payments ended division by division with the death of the last survivor within each division. Subscribers could purchase shares in as many divisions of their age class as they wished. For reasons discussed below, multiple share purchasers earned better returns by buying shares in different divisions than by holding many shares in a single division. Unfortunately, the published data report the Weir number of divisions and the number of persons and shares within each division, but take no account of the much more frequent practice of buying shares in several divisions.27 Previous estimates based on the published data therefore overcount the number of individuals involved.
To correct them, we need an estimate of the number of divisions entered per subscriber in each age class for each tontine (a total of ninety groups). This was done by sampling the original receipt books preserved in the Archives Nationales.28 The books contain one receipt for each nominee, listing all the divisions to which he or she was assigned. Receipts for each age class were bound separately. Beyond that, there was no apparent order in the receipt books. Small and large purchases, nobles and spinsters, were all intermingled, so a simple random selection of about 150 subscribers was taken for each group.
The average number of divisions entered by each nominee was typically between two and three. 28 Archives Nationales de la France, Serie P. Chambre des Comptes, P5875-P5932, appears to be complete for the fourth through tenth tontines. 29 The exact rates, for the fourth through tenth tontines were: 2.289, 2.877, 3.035, 3.101, 3.022, 2.177, and 3.231. The rates were higher in older age groups than in younger, indicating more multiple purchases at higher ages, except in the lottery-tontines of 1743, where they were nearly equal. Note that these rates indicate number of divisions per nominee. Subscribers could invest on several lives other than their own. In practice, this seems to have been infrequent and generally confined to other family members, who would then inherit the shares on their own lives. It seems reasonable to consider these eventual owners as creditors of the government.
Two periods of direct military confrontation with England permit direct comparison of the governments' success in raising money on tontines. In the 1690s, England failed miserably on one, raising barely a tenth of the desired million pounds in capital. The English failure in the tontine of 1693 was immediately followed by an offer to charter the Bank of England, if its founders could lend the government a million pounds at 8 percent.30 Again in the early years of the Seven Years' War England had to revoke a proposed tontine for lack of support. Two years later France raised nearly 47 million livres for its war effort.
Why were tontines such a success in France and such a failure in Britain? Most of the relevant hypotheses can be classed as either demand-side differences (consumer preferences) or supply-side differences (government behavior).
Victorian England knew the reason: "they were always more popular on the continent than in this country, where benefits for the entire solace of his own old age are generally neglected by the Englishman in favor of a provision for his immediate successors.' '31 More recently, Vivian Rotman-Zelizer has speculated that the greater French preference for old-age security over intergenerational transfers explains not only its high demand for tontines but also its hostility to life insurance.32 The age patterns of tontine nominations lend some support. In England the vast majority of nominees were minor children; in France they were adults (see Table 3 Resolving disputes about demand versus supply explanations requires information on prices. To make sense of the price information, and then to interpret the policies that set the prices, we need first to consider the economics of tontines in the abstract.
TONTINE ECONOMICS
To begin, we need a measure of the price of a tontine that can be compared with other investments in which private lenders trade capital sums to the government in exchange for future income streams. Present discounted value is a widely used measure, but it requires making an assumption about the discount rate used by lenders.35 The internal rate of return is a better choice. We can then consider how preferences might affect the choice of asset for a given internal rate of return.
All the major eighteenth-century debt instruments can be described as special cases of a general type. In exchange for lending a capital sum (K), lenders receive an annual rent (R), for a term of years (T). The rent may be augmented or diminished in some years by a multiplier (At), and its receipt may be conditional on some other factors with probability Pt. In the absence of inflation, the present value of a conditional stream of future payments is K= R .T (At Pt)
(1) I (1 + i)t where K equals the capital sum in year 0 that is equivalent in value to the future payments, R is the rent paid in the first year, T is the term of the loan, At is the fraction (or multiple) of R that is paid in year t, Pt is the probability that the payment R * At is paid, and i is the discount rate. Investments were often priced in terms of combinations of parameters such as years' purchase (KIR) or the initial interest rate (RIK). Investors were well aware, however, that the true rate of return was also influenced by the term and any other contingencies affecting the probability and size of payments. When all the other parameters are known, the value of i that satisfies the present value identity is known as the internal rate of return. It offers a way to compare very different investments.
In the case of a perpetual rent, sometimes called a "consol," the rent R is paid in each year, so A, = p, = 1 for all t.36 As T goes to infinity, we have i= R/K The internal rate of return is equal to the initial interest rate for a perpetual rent. Britain's funded debt after 1750 was almost wholly of this type.
In the early part of the eighteenth century Britain frequently used long annuities for fixed terms, the most common being 99-year annuities. These instruments were very similar to perpetual rents except that the term (T) was 99 years and not infinite. At nontrivial rates of interest, 99 years is not much different from forever, and the internal rate of return was only slightly less than the initial interest rate (RIK). France occasionally offered short-term annuities, often in the form of lotteries in which each year's income might be augmented by a lucky draw.37 The rate of return on short-term annuities could be very different from the initial interest rate.38
Annuities were also issued on lives. Typically, the lender would receive a fixed income until the death of the person on whose life the claim was based. In most of the eighteenth-century government life annuities, the nominee could be someone other than the owner of the annuity and the annuity could be sold to a third party. In eighteenthcentury Britain, life annuities were most often issued as supplemental 36 In 1751 Britain consolidated various 3 percent perpetual annuities into one general stock. The term consol is an abbreviation of the Three per cent. Consolidated Annuities created in that year. To avoid confusion between a historically specific government security and a general type of asset, the term "consol" will be reserved for British 3 percents after 1751.
3 See Vuhrer, Dette publique, pp. 191-96, 263-69, for descriptions. They were especially popular in the 1740s and again under Necker. Lotteries were often used in both countries to introduce variance into an average rate of return on any form of loan. In Britain they appear to have been the rule rather than the exception; see J. J. Grellier, The Terms of All the Loans (London, 1805). Although we now think of higher variance as requiring a premium on the expected return, they evidently thought that the lure of a gamble would draw in funds at a lower average rate.
38 James C. Riley, Seven Years War, pp. 174-75, shows that in at least one case the government actually offered to borrow at zero interest while listing the (initial) interest rate at 3 percent. Weir payments on other rents.39 In France they were the largest share of government debt payments in most years.
In a life annuity, A, is constant but Pt. the probability of receiving the fixed payment R, is the probability of surviving t years from the date of purchase. If we define lx as the probability of surviving from birth to age x, then Pt -( , ) , where a = age at purchase of the annuity. la Thus payments are constant as long as one is alive to receive them, but expected income falls over time. The cost to the government depends on the mortality schedule of the participants. Younger participants generally have longer life expectancies and are thus more costly to the government at any given initial interest rate (RIK).
A tontine is a life annuity with benefit of survivorship. The probability of receiving payment is exactly the same as for a life annuity, but the size of the payment depends on the mortality experience of the other members of the tontine class. In its classic form all payments are distributed among the surviving members. The government's obligation therefore remains constant until the last nominee dies. From the government's perspective, a tontine is approximately equivalent to a term annuity, with the length of term equal to the expected age of extinction of the class of nominees, minus its age at nomination.
Under certain circumstances the expected income stream to the purchaser will mirror the government's perspective. In the simplest case of a large tontine class of single shareholders, all of whom are the same age at purchase (a), the annual multiplier on the base payment for survivors is N * la At = a ,where N is the number of nominees.
N l(a+t)
The size of payment grows in inverse proportion to the probability of survival. Income rises if one survives to collect. When all participants have the same mortality schedule, A, is just the inverse of Pt. The two effects (A, and p,) exactly cancel, so the expected payment stream is constant. In expected value terms, the tontine is equivalent to a long annuity with a term equal to the expected age at extinction of the class. The internal rate of return, formula 1, does not take into account inflation, risk aversion, or the elasticities of intertemporal substitution at different ages or points in time. Because perpetual rents, annuities, Tontines and Revolution 111 and tontines had different time paths of income, the expected utility of one type of investment might be different from another even if the internal rate of return (calculated from formula 1) were the same. We need to consider these other motivations, as well.
Several important factors differentiate between perpetual rents on the one hand and life-contingent rents on the other. The most obvious is the value placed on bequests. The internal rate of return for a perpetual rent values income equally before and after the death of an investor. Investors who placed no value on bequests would prefer life-contingent loans at the same internal rate of return. If governments were indifferent they could sell life-contingent annuities at a discount to "selfish" investors. Governments might not be indifferent because life-contingent loans require a higher payment stream in the near term, with payments eventually disappearing.
Life-contingent contracts like tontines and life annuities were sometimes criticized as robbing children of their inheritance. Selfish parents could use life-contingent contracts in this way, but there were many other ways to rob children of their inheritance, and, more importantly, perfectly altruistic families might also wish to use them. Life-contingent annuities provide insurance against the risk of living longer than expected. They could spare children the burden of supporting a long-lived parent. The life-contingent nature of the contract creates no inherent intergenerational conflict.
The main disadvantage of life-contingent contracts is their limited resale potential. They constitute a classic example of a market for "lemons." Prospective buyers will have far less information about survival prospects than the seller of an annuity on his own life and are likely to be suspicious. The costs of providing proof of survival from year to year are much higher for a third party. The same problems make it difficult to borrow against life annuity income. Governments might care about resale markets, too. Britain built its financial system on easily traded government debt. Some authors claim that France preferred inalienable life-contingent debt because there was no resale market to reflect the state of confidence in the government.
There are some important differences between tontines and life annuities. Tontine income rises rapidly at older ages, when mortality is high, while life annuity income is constant. If labor productivity is also declining at those ages, tontine income streams might provide better life-cycle insurance. In both cases those who die early lose and those who live long gain relative to the average. In tontines the differential is wider. For the same ex ante expected internal rate of return, annuities will turn out to be a better deal for the lowest 80 percent of the longevity distribution, while the 20 percent longest-lived investors would do better with tontines.
The greater riskiness of tontines has led some observers to consider From the shareholder's perspective, tontine income is sensitive to two factors that play no role in any of the other debt instruments: the life expectancy of other subscribers and the percentage of total shares one holds. If the other subscribers have higher life expectancy than a given potential investor, then that investor's income will not rise as fast as his probability of survival will fall. If none of the others died, the tontine just replicates a life annuity. Similarly, if one investor holds all the shares in a tontine class it will be just an annuity on his life.
To evaluate the importance of these factors, I made some calculations of the internal rate of return (i) corresponding to different values of the initial interest rate (RIK) for tontines and annuities. The calculations are based on an investor aged 42 at the start, and use the mortality rates of tontine subscribers from the first two French tontines to estimate the probability of survival.4' For the same initial interest rate, tontines always yield a higher internal rate of return by two to three percentage points. A tontine designed for an internal rate of return of 3 percent would yield zero to a 42-year-old investor holding the entire stock. Tontine investors should therefore be very concerned with the age composition of their co-participants, and should be inclined not to make large purchases within a tontine group. 8 Table 4 shows the estimated internal rates of return by age at nomination for representative tontines. The estimates apply to single share purchases. For tontines in which nominees were sorted by five-year age groups, the estimates assume that the life table effects cancel out in calculating the expected income stream.42 For plans with larger age groupings, the actual age distribution of enrollments was used to calculate the proportion of the class surviving to each payment period (the inverse of A ).43 The life table for the age group under consideration was then used to calculate the probability of receipt of payment (pt). 
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Sources: Table 4. separate classes by age, thus raising the expected returns for younger nominees and lowering them for older. Despite the high expected returns in 1693, enrollments were low. We can see the reason by comparing tontine returns with alternatives. In France, tontine loans were often issued shortly before or after life annuity loans. In England, each tontine plan was paired with an alternative." Figure 3 shows the premium paid to tontine lenders, measured as the simple difference between the tontine internal rate of return and that of the alternative. The tontine premia enhance the findings of the simple price comparisons. French tontines offered a considerable premium over alternatives, especially for older investors. English tontines were barely fair to even the youngest nominees. The alternatives in 1693 were much more rewarding than the tontine, at all ages. We do not need to probe the psyches of French investors to understand why they bought more tontines than the English.
ECONOMIC POLITICS AND THE TONTINE
More people bought tontines in France because the government offered them at more attractive rates of return than did the English, and more often. The question, then, is why. We can better understand French policy by comparing it with the English. As noted earlier, 44 In 1693 the alternative was a 14 percent life annuity for any age. In 1757 the tontine plan offered an alternative fixed-term annuity without survivorship benefits. The entire plan was then displaced with a mixed offering of life annuities and consols. In 1789 the alternatives was a 4.25 percent annuity for 69 years. Tonti's original plan was rejected by the Parlement of Paris for two reasons: they couldn't calculate its costs, and they thought its prices too low relative to life annuities. England, after its failure with the 1693 tontine, learned how to calculate the cost of tontines more accurately. Their subsequent efforts at raising money on tontines offered market rates of return. In France the second issue dominated price formation. Tontine prices (in years' purchase) were set close to the prices of life annuities.
In the tontines of the 1690s the French and English governments paid approximately the same overall rate of return of 8.5 to 9 percent. This was about the same rate paid on other loans.45 Neither did as well as hoped, but the French plan fared better because it grouped participants by age and adjusted the initial rents by age to smooth the rates of return. The English tontine of 1693 was designed for self-destruction. By pooling all participants, it effectively offered above-market rates of return only for younger nominees but then offered them an even better option in the 14 percent life annuities. Neither country shows clear evidence of understanding the true costs involved in tontines.
During the Seven Years' War both countries again offered tontines. The English plan of 1757 shows clearly that the government had by that time mastered the basic economics of the tontine. They understood that it was, from their perspective, a term annuity.
The 1757 plan offered five different initial rents for a capital payment 45 In 1694 the English government chartered the Bank of England in exchange for a 1.2 million pound loan at 8 percent. The New East India Company charter went for the same terms in 1698. of 100 pounds, each corresponding to a different tontine age group. The tontines were scheduled to convert to life annuities after a stated term of years. Investors could opt instead for a fixed term annuity at any of the five rates. The length of the fixed term annuity varied with the rate and corresponded roughly to the expected time to extinction of the matching tontine class. The basic plan is shown in Table 5 . The actuaries evidently began with the initial rents, which vary in smooth discrete grades. They then calculated durations for the tontines and the fixed-term annuities. These are odd-looking and quite precise-especially the 36.75 years for the highest rents. Considering that payments were made half-yearly, it seems excessively precise. In fact, the terms for each age group are exactly consistent with an internal rate of return of 3.5 percent and a capital payment (present value) of 100 pounds for the tontine, and 102.5 pounds for the fixed-term alternative. Evidently, they attributed a present value of 2.5 pounds to the life annuity extension of the tontine plan and adjusted the fixed-term annuity durations accordingly. That is not precisely accurate, but makes very little difference to the rate-ofreturn calculations. The "saw-tooth" pattern that appears in Figure 2 results from my calculations based on five-year age groups. Rates of return calculated for midpoint ages of the ranges used by the tontine planners are close to 3.5 percent for each age group.
The 1757 loan was intended to raise 2.5 million pounds, but initial subscriptions amounted to only 313,000 pounds.46 A replacement bill sought 3 million pounds on a combination of 3 percent consols and a 1.125 percent life annuity on any age. Subscribers to the tontine plan were allowed to transfer. Since the net rate of return was slightly higher under the new plan, they did, and the tontine was cancelled. Thus the English government again undercut its own tontine plan.
In 1789 a new tontine was launched.47 English actuaries had gained even more confidence at fixing tontine prices to match market rates of return. The baseline annual rents, shown in Table 5 , were obviously chosen for reasons other than aesthetics. Recall my earlier observation that market interest rates on consols were around 4 percent at the end of the 1780s. Calculating an initial interest rate for each age class by treating it as a term annuity with the term set as the number of years from the midpoint age of the class to age 95, using 4 percent as the discount rate, we solve for initial interest within 3p of the listed rates in each case. Since prices were quoted in half-shilling (6p) intervals, this is within rounding error.
The underwriters of the 1789 tontine evidently had difficulty selling the tontine shares, and William Pitt argued in the House of Commons that their interests must be preserved. He proposed that they be allowed to transfer into a long annuity at 4.25 percent annual interest having 69.25 years left to run-an alternative with an internal rate of return almost exactly equal to 4 percent. This second-guessing was by now traditional, but Pitt introduced some new wrinkles. The alternative was not a higher rate of return but an equivalent one. In addition, the government attempted to protect those who held onto tontines, "to keep them on the same footing" as if the plan had been filled. To do this the government nominated 4,345 lives to replace those who left. The government kept the payments due to its nominees. Evidently the government attempted to counteract the fact that it was the older nominees within each class that were most likely to leave. Thus government nominees accounted for 61 percent of the older halves of all classes and 54 percent of the younger halves.
English tontine policy had evolved over the eighteenth century into sound, "textbook" financial practice. Given an assessment of the market discount rate, tontines could be constructed to offer that rate. There is no evidence on which to judge whether or not the government was able to calculate its life-contingent debt costs at different points in the eighteenth century. The fact that the technology existed and was not used by men with adequate training and intelligence to use it forces us at least to consider possible motives for avoiding its use.
Two such reasons seem particularly compelling. The government seems to have had an aversion to paying rates above 5 percent on perpetual debt. Riley places the wartime peak market interest rate at about 6.5 percent in 1760.54 Necker cited the same market rate for 1776. The government added little new perpetual debt from the end of the Seven Years' War to the Revolution, probably because it could not have done so at 5 percent or less. The government needed money, and was constrained by the market to pay competitive rates, but desired to disguise the true rate.
That does not explain why the government paid rates of return well above 7 percent for tontines and life annuities. If that premium reflected the public's preference for other assets, then the government was paying a stiff penalty to hide its true cost of borrowing. Alternatively, the government was subsidizing some lenders. Since most tontines and life annuities sold out quickly, it seems plausible that the return was above the market rate, even for life-contingent loans. 
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The result was subsidized loans to, among others, the urban middle class. Intentional or not, that had beneficial consequences. The French government before 1789 traded in privilege. Tax exemptions were sold, as were the rights to collect taxes. The urban middle classes benefited little from such privileges and paid a large share of the taxes. It would have upset the principles on which the privileges of the nobility rested publicly to accord similar privileges to commoners. But the numerous and economically powerful urban bourgeoisie needed to be included in any stable political coalition. Subsidizing retirements and the pensioning off of relatives through generous tontines and annuities might ally the urban middle classes with the government.
Some support for this interpretation can be found in the wording of tontine edicts. They often referred to the great public demand for tontines and to the happy reception of previous issues. The inviolability of tontine income was guaranteed in the strongest possible terms. Such self-promotion by the government is not uncommon in official documents. In the case of tontines the facts support it, until Terray. As part of a general program of reform and repudiation begun in January 1770, Terray froze tontine payments to all subscribers at the 1769 levels and converted them to life annuities.57 In other words the future benefits of survivorship which ought to have gone to the surviving subscribers were instead transferred to the State. It is noteworthy that even here tontine lenders fared rather better than others. Unlike holders of other forms of debt, no tontine lender suffered an actual decline in income. What they lost was the potential for future income growth but what they were left with was in most cases a life annuity on good terms (a 10 percent minimum was applied to all tontine classes).
Tontine reform had little consequence for the budgetary problems of 1770. The intriguing feature of Terray's plan is its concern with long-run solvency rather than short-run expediency. Terray claimed that his conversion would save 150 million livres over the life of the tontines. Terray also initiated a conversion from tontines to life annuities in another, less literal but more important sense. When the short-run needs of 1770 demanded an immediate solution, Terray chose to sell nine million livres in annual life annuity rents to the Dutch at a rate of return easily as high as the "onerous" tontines.59 Needless to say, robbing French families to pay wealthy Dutch investors did not make Terray any more popular.60
The rapid growth in life annuity rents after 1770 is documented in Table 2 . They replaced some of the opportunities taken away by closing off tontines. But they did not restore the income lost to tontine-holders, nor the faith of the urban bourgeoisie in the Crown. The tontine experience may have made the holders of annuities wary that the government's renewed concern with debt might lead to a repudiation of their investments.
At a flat 10 percent interest at all ages, life annuities were just as expensive as the tontines they replaced. There was one important distinction. The life annuities offered the best returns on young nominees, not adults. This encouraged the development of the "Genevan formula," in which bankers bought annuities on selected lives, pooled them, and sold shares to private investors.6' Some of the elements of political coalition-building were therefore weakened.
The government evidently needed some institution in which it could borrow vast sums without acknowledging its depreciating credit rating. Wittingly or unwittingly, it needed the urban middle class to support the loans. After 1770 the holders of life-contingent debt could no longer depend on the government to keep its side of the implicit bargain.
TONTINES AND THE FALL OF THE ANCIEN REGIME As many historians have recently reaffirmed, the French Revolution was essentially political in both cause and consequence.62 One possible 58 Terray converted tontine rents in which the government's obligation is constant until the last death to life annuity rents in which the rents due each individual end with his or her death. For each of the tontine classes under age 95 in 1770, I projected forward for each year to 1850 the fraction of the total rents to be extinguished due to mortality from its age in 1770. I used a single-year-of-age life table derived from Deparcieux's data to project mortality. Had tontines stayed in force the cumulative total would have been 297 million; as life annuities, 135 million. s9 Although they were nominally at 8 percent initial interest, Terray proposed to accept depreciated government paper for half the capital, boosting the effective rate above 10 percent. 60 In 1776 Terray's "memoirs" were written by Jean-Jacques Coquereau (Memoires de V'abbe Terrai) as a virulent attack. They included some of the popular jokes about him circulating in Paris. 
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Necker's annuities.64 The problem was that the subsidized retirement of French adults had been intermingled with profitable speculation by bankers. Thus when Robespierre argued for leniency for life annuitants on the grounds that they were ordinary Parisians, he was condemned by Cambon, the author of the reform plan, who sought to reduce the payments to speculating bankers.65
In these years, described by J. F. Bosher as a period of transition to a bureaucratic system of public finance, the government failed to reconcile with a critical political group through a redistribution of privilege, yet did not complete the transition to a new culture of public finance in which privilege was the exception rather than the rule.66 CONCLUSIONS Britain offered tontines at market rates of return and found the demand to be low. The French government's greater success at raising money on tontine loans in the eighteenth century can be attributed mainly to the high level of interest rates offered, especially for older nominees. If French investors had any cultural preference for lifecontingent loans, the government did not take advantage of it. The tontine's reputation in France as an onerous form of borrowing for the state was therefore deserved. Public recognition of this fact by the government led to abandonment of tontines and eventually to partial repudiation of tontine obligations. It did not lead to a rationalization of public debt, because the life annuities offered in replacement were, at a flat 10 percent interest rate, just as onerous.
In eighteenth-century Britain the government scrupulously avoided differential treatment of investors by pricing all its loans at market rates of return and by maintaining payments. As a result, fiscal pressure did not lead to rivalrous competition over the system of government. In France, by contrast, public finance consisted of a series of subsidizations and strategic defaults. Until Terray, the interests of the predominantly middle-class subscribers to tontines had been ardently preserved. His reforms taught them and others like them that in periods of fiscal crisis they were powerless to defend their interests within the structure of the monarchy. They were therefore prepared to contend for control of the system of government when fiscal crisis created the opportunity in 1789. 64 In his De'nonciation de lagiotage (Paris, 1787). It is one of history's ironies that government profligacy should be condemned by Mirabeau, a man who had been imprisoned by his father, the Physiocratic economist, for nonpayment of debts, and who fell from grace after it was revealed posthumously that he had conspired with the king in exchange for relief of debts.
